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tended
mislead and confuse them. We conclude that
of
error is well founded
in the
entire record, that a
of
is shown.
The
is reversed.

[L.A. No. 23779.
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Dec. 30, 1955.]

BERNARD P. CALHOUN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Elections-Offenses-Solicitation of Campaign Contributions

From Licensees.-Elec. Code, § 5002.5, prohibiting elective officers empowered to issue licenses from soliciting or receiving
campaign contributions from licensees, is constitutional, since
what might begin as an innocent request or acceptance of a
contribution from a licensee might ripen into a demand with
which the licensee must comply in order to enjoy the privileges
of his license, and since there is a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that the danger of corrupt practice is greater in
the case of the official having direct influence on the right of
the licensee to conduct his business than in other situations.
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside.-An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited
if there is a rational ground for the conclusion that an offense
has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.
[3] Conspiracy-Criminal-Indictment.-Direct proof of a formal
understanding between parties to a conspiracy is not required
as the basis of an indictment or information.
[4] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition to restrain a trial on an indictment charging a
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Elections, § 232 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Indictment and Information, § 78 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 138 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conspiracy,
§ 29 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Elections, § 153;
Indictment and
Information, § 88;
Conspiracy,§ 14; [4, 6-8] Grand Jury, § 30.5;
[5] Conspiracy, § 5.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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the

program in other ways than as a mere donor,
defendant in the officer's office directly dealing or
with persons supplying
or doing campaign
work for such
showed a direct link between defendant
and the proceeds from solicitation of retail liquor licensees,
and showed that he
"received'' money for the oftlcer's
Conspiracy-Criminal-To Commit Acts Injurious to Public
Morals.--Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 5, establishing a punishment
for conspiracy to commit any act injurious to the public morals
and to pervert and obstruct justice, is constitutional.
Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition to restrain a trial on an indictment alleging· that
defendant and an elective officer with others conspired to do
acts injurious to the public morals and to pervert and obstruct
justice (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 5), the evidence supported
the indictment where it could reasonably be inferred therefrom
that defendant and the officer acted together to use the
officer's oftlcial position as a member of the Board of Equalization for their private gain by collecting funds from licensees
and applicants for licenses from such board.
Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition
to restrain a trial on an indictment alleging that defendant
and an elective officer agreed to prepare false papers and
records for fraudulent purposes on trials, proceedings and
inquiries authorized by law, the indictment is supported by
evidence showing use by a printer of fictitious ledger accounts
to show funds received from defendant and the otlicer, checks
given to a nonexistent printing company, the substitution of
a new check for that made out by a contributor to the officer's
campaign fund, and other acti,,ities which, a reasonable grand
juror might infer, were done with the intent to disguise their
nature.
[8] Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition to
restrain a trial on an indictment, a contention that the trial
judge was biased against defendant in ruling on his motion
to set aside the indictment does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to justify the indictment for purposes of the
petition for prohibition; such objection should be presented
at the time of trial.
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of San
County and John A. Hewicker, Judge
from requiring petitioner to stand trial on an indictment. Writ denied.
& Schall, John W. Preston and Charles H. Carr
for Petitioner.

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James,
Deputy Attorney General, James Don Keller, District Attorney (San Diego), Barton C. Sheela, Jr., and Jack R. Levitt,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-Bernard P. Calhoun was indicted by the
grand jury which accused him of having conspired with others
to commit certain acts in violation of the Elections Code.
this proceeding, he is endeavoring to prohibit the superior
court from requiring him to stand trial upon these charges.
In count one of the indictment, Calhoun is alleged to have
conspired with William G. Bonelli and others to commit the
crime of soliciting, asking and receiving contributions from
persons licensed by the Board of Equalization to sell alcoholic
beverages. 'rhese contributions were solicited and received,
it is charged, for use in campaigns for the reelection of Bonelli
as a member of the Board of Equalization.
The second count asserts that Calhoun and Bonelli, with
others, conspired "to do acts injurious to the public morals
and to pervert and obstruct justice'' (Pen. Code, § 182, subd.
in that they agreed together to use Bonelli's official position
as a member of the Board of Equalization for their private
gain by collecting funds from licensees and applicants for
licenses from the Board of Equalization.
Other acts characterized as being contrary to section 182,
subdivision 5, of the Penal Code are specified in count three
of the indictment. In this count, Calhoun and Bonelli are
charged with having agreed to prepare false papers and
records for fraudulent purposes upon trials, proceedings and
inquiries authorized by law.
Principally, the evidence presented to the grand jury
pertains to contributions made by wholesale licensees and by
retail licensees in San Diego and Los Angeles Counties. Similar operations were carried on in Orange, Riverside and
San Bernardino Counties. This evidence, with the inferences
reasonably to be drawn from it, shows the following pattern
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activity in San Diego County. Substantially the same
was followed in the other counties.
In 1950 and 1954 Bonelli was a candidate for reelection
to the Board of Equalization. Shortly before the 1950 cam·wmiam Cook, who was ''public relations man'' for
met with Charles E. Berry, Liquor Control Officer
San Diego and Imperial Counties. They discussed the
of soliciting campaign contributions from retail liquor
licensees. At their request AI Tossas, a former liquor salesman, agreed, for certain compensation, to take charge of work
making these solicitations. Berry, Cook, Frank Bompenand Ray McCullough assisted Tossas.
Tossas was furnished with ''pretty thorough'' lists of bars,
stores, markets, hotels, and similar establishments with
a notation beside the name of the licensee as to the amount
the ''contribution'' expected from him. Following the
"canned sales talk," Tossas would ask the licensee if he
thought that Bonelli was "head of the liquor industry" and
if it were not worth the amount specified on the list for him
to have Bonelli reelected. The ''contribution'' almost invariably made was accepted with the understanding that it
was to promote Bonelli's campaign.
Many of the licensees solicited had liquor violation charges
then pending against them. Although Tossas was specifically
instructed by Cook not to say that the contribution would
affect the pending charges, those whose licenses were being
questioned gave "more generously" than others.
Cook instructed Tossas to get a "certain amount" of cash.
Checks were to be made payable to the National Democratic
Club of California, the Aldine Printing Company, or the
Woolever Press. A check, made payable to the Bonelli camfund, was not accepted. Some such checks were returned to the licensee with the request that it be made payable
to one of the designated payees.
From time to time Cook told Tossas that a sufficient number
of checks drawn in favor of one of the three designated payees
been received and that thereafter checks should be made
out to one of the other payees. All cash and checks received
Tossas, which he estimated amounted to between $15,000
and $20,000, were turned over by him to Cook. There is no
direct evidence as to how the payees obtained these checks
but the record shows that they received some of them. Cook
Tossas $1,500 as compensation for his services.
Early in 1954, Joseph Cannon set up campaign headquar-
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ters in San
the operation of which he later turned
over to Dorothy Hall J ahant, who had done the same work
in the 1950 campaign. Ray McCullough was placed in charge
of obtaining contributions. Collections were made from licensees named in lists furnished to McCullough, ''in the same
manner'' as in the 1950 campaign. McCullough was assisted
by Girolamo Cusenza and Cannon. Some of the contributions
obtained
them were made in cash.
also received
checks made
to one of them. These checks were
cashed
them and the proceeds turned over to McCullough.
The record also shows that checks were received made payable to the National Democratic Club of California, the Aldine
Printing Company, or the 'N oolever Press. A check from the
Mexican Village, a liquor licensee, which had been made payable to the Bonelli campaign fund, was returned with directions to make it payable to one of the named payees. Other
checks from liquor licensees, drawn in favor of the campaign
fund, were received by Mrs. J ahant and turned over to Cannon
or McCullough.
Approximately $8,000 was received by McCullough. Cash
and checks received by him were placed in sealed envelopes
and given to Mrs. Jahant for delivery to the National Democratic Club of California. She testified that she delivered
one su<ih envelope to the secretary of Nate Snyder, secretarytreasurer of the club, and one to Bonelli's secretary. Charles
Berry testified that Nate Snyder was the person designated
to receive contributions to that organization.
In the Long Beach area, members of the Long Beach Tavern
Association collected contributions from licensees. The money
was solicited for use in Bonelli's campaign and to defeat
Proposition 3. These purposes were decided upon in tavern
association meetings in which Albert Eisenberg, the association's attorney, acted as the representative of Bonelli. Contributions were made by checks made payable to the National
Democratic Club of California, the Aldine Printing Company,
the vV oolever Press, and a fictitious company designated as
the ''Allied Printers'' or ''Allied Printing Company.''
Nate Snyder described the National Democratic Club of
California as an organization consisting of a board of directors
who were its officers. I_Jeonard vVilson was president; R. S.
Sparks, vice-president; and Snyder, secretary-treasurer. According to Snyder, he had been authorized by the board to
make disbursements to various candidates for political offices,
largAly in his own discretion. He was the only person author-

CALHOUN

v.

SuPERIOR CoUR'l"

23

[46 C.2d 18; 291 P.2d 474]

cheeks on the
account. 'rhe corporadid not solicit contributions. He testified that
endorsed checks from retail liquor licensees but denied
out
money toward Bonelli's campaign
a slate of candidates which included
told the
that
one week
was he told that he was president of
National Democratic Club of California. He had no
of the functioning of that organization, he said;
not authorized the use of his name as its president
the expenditure of funds by Snyder and, as far as he
. he had never been a member of the club.
With regard to contributions by wholesale licensees, the
shows these facts :
The Southern California Business Men's Association is a
organization of men in the hotel, restaurant, grocery,
distilled spirits, beer, wine, manufacturing and retail
businesses. Dues are contributed regularly by its members.
money is expended for trade publications and similar
purposes, Some political contributions are made, but they
consist generally of printing in trade publications of slates
of candidates endorsed by the association. At the times of
the Bonelli campaigns, Calhoun was one of its 50 directors
and Albert vVeigel its executive vice-president.
Calhoun also is general counsel and ''public relations man''
the Southern California Spirits Foundation, an association
of all but one of the major wholesale liquor distributors in the Los Angeles area. He had no authority to
checks on the Spirits Foundation account, but he was
carte blanche in the political use of its funds. He often
reeeived signed checks made out in blank. The association
regular dues to the Business Men's Association.
a meeting called by A.rthur Samish in 1947, it was
decided to establish a "Research and Public Relations Fund,"
to reeeive contributions for use in campaigns affecting the
alcoholic beverage industry and to support some political candidates. Originally, this was a bank account of the Busil\ien 's Association; later the account was also used by
11onmembers as a depositary for contributions.
first the expense of the campaign in opposition to a
~'"~-~~~ business tax was paid from this fund. Later opposition to a tax on alcoholic beverages was financed from it.
was generally collected, when a need was anticipated,
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those participating in the maintenance
the association decided to reactivate the fund for
use
to Proposition 3 which was to be voted on
in November. Because some members were reluctant to make
until all had participated, their contributions were
in a special account. However, during that year
deposits were made in the fund account. The bulk of
them came from the Spirits Foundation, but several thousands
of dollars were contributed by the California Brewers Institute and the Bohemian Distributing Company. These deposits
were ''directed'' and ''arranged'' by Calhoun.
Five persons, including Calhoun and vV eigel, were authorized to sign checks on the fund account, the signatures of
any two of them being required. As a practical matter,
however, Calhoun exercised complete control over the expenditure of the money. Generally, he would present a check to
Weigel who signed it without inquiry as to its purpose.
Substantial amounts were drawn by checks made payable to
cash. Other checks, pursuant to Calhoun's instructions, were
made out in payment of bills. Of the funds used, Calhoun
could" account for less than 10 per cent as having been used
in connection with Proposition 3. As to other payments,
he claimed the privilege against self-incrimination.
Records maintained by '\Veigel, however, showed that numerous checks were drawn on this account in payment of bills
presented by the Woolever Press, the Civic Research Press,
Aldine Printing Company and the Kennedy Outdoor Advertising Company for expenses in connection with the Bonelli
campaign. vV eigel pressed Calhoun for receipts showing the
purpose for which cash withdrawals were expended. Several
of the receipts given to him came from a book in the office
of Bonelli.
On one occasion, the Aldine Printing Company billed the
Southern California Business Men's Association for $3,000,
as the charge for printing some booklets. When Weigel
inquired of Calhoun concerning this bill he was told to write
a check on the public relations fund for $1,500, which he
did. Later, he received a bill for the balance of $1,507.
When he again mentioned the matter to Calhoun, he was
told to draw a check on the fund for $1,507 payable to himself
as trustee. He did so and turned the cash over to Calhoun.
Later, Calhoun presented a receipt from the Aldine Printing
Company for that amount. The record shows, however, that
this receipt did not represent a cash payment but was given
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to acknowledge receipt of several small checks made payable
to Aldine. It is a reasonable inference that these checks were
from retail liquor licensees either in San Diego or Long Beach.
Harold Judson testified that Bonelli, by telephone, informed
that someone would visit him with regard to Proposi3. Later Bonelli again telephoned to Judson about "the
he had spoken about previously" and asked Judson
he would cash a check as an accommodation. Judson
giving Bonelli's messenger $5,000 for a check drawn
the account of the Southern California Spirits Foundation.
check made payable to James Garibaldi, as trustee, was
nauu.,'"u in the same way.
At Calhoun's request, a check for
on the account of the Spirits Foundation was cashed
Garibaldi's secretary and the proceeds delivered to Calhoun's messenger. The purpose of this check ostensibly was for
work in connection with the campaign against Proposition 3.
The record shows that a major part of Bonelli's campaign
printing and advertising was done by the Woolever Press,
the Aldine Printing Company, the Kennedy Outdoor AdverCompany and George West. Describing the manner
in which printing is provided for political campaigns, Charles
Woolever, of the \Voolever Press, testified that customarily
someone guarantees a candidate's printing bill for a certain
amount. Upon notification by the printer of the guarantee,
the candidate orders specific work to be done. The bill is
by campaign contributions either given directly to him
from the contributor or furnished by the candidate.
In 1950, Bonelli's printing bill was guaranteed by the
National Democratic Club of California; in 1954, his guarantors included the Southern California Spirits Foundation.
Woolever and Bonelli agreed upon the printing to be done.
Most of the bills were paid by checks of third persons made
payable to .Woolever.
Several checks were identified as those of retail liquor
licensees in the Long Beach and San Diego areas delivered
to ·woolever by messenger. Some of these checks were applied
to Bonelli's printing bills; others were cashed by Woolever,
and the proceeds given to the messenger. According to Woolevcr, he knew that some of the money from checks he cashed
was returned to Bonelli.
During the 1954 primary election campaign, Bonelli called
Woolever to his office and presented to him a number of
checks, aggregating about $2,300, made payable to the Woolever Press and the Allied Printing Company, a fictitious
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company. These checks were cashed by Woolever at Bonelli's
request and the money given to his messenger. Among the
checks received by Woolever was one signed by Calhoun and
Weigel drawn on the Research and Public Relations Fund.
Later Bonelli asked Woolever to set up a ledger account
for printing work to be done during the general election
campaign for the ''Committee on Proposition 3. '' Woolever
testified, however, that he did not do any printing in connection with Proposition 3. Instead, at Bonelli's request,
he charged this account with three checks, aggregating some
$4,100, payable to Leo Katcher, whom the record shows to
have been the author of a book entitled "Billion Dollar Blackjack." The book was published by George West for the Civic
Research Press, a company formed by Bonelli. As payment
for these checks, Woolever was given checks aggregating some
$1,275, payable to Woolever and written by third persons,
about $1,000 in cash from Bonelli, and a check for $4,250
drawn on the account of the Southern California Spirits
Foundation. At Bonelli's request, Woolever cashed the latter
check, keeping $1,975 for himself and paying the balance
to Bonelli.
Bonelli requested Woolever to bill some $4,414 worth of
printing to the ''Veterans Committee for Bonelli.'' As
partial payment for this bill, in Bonelli's office, Calhoun
gave Woolever a check for $1,000. A few days later, also
in Bonelli's office, Woolever received from Calhoun a check
for $500. Both checks were drawn on the account of the
Research and Public Relations Fund.
Harold Feinstein, the proprietor of the Aldine Printing
Company, testified that he had regularly done printing work
in Bonelli's campaigns and required no guarantee. In 1950,
such work was charged by him to an account in the name
of Ed Levine, identified as having done solicitation work for
Bonelli in Los Angeles County. On at least two occasions
in that campaign, Feinstein furnished fictitious invoices to
cover work paid for by a wholesale liquor licensee. In the
1954 campaigns, money to finance Bonelli's campaign printing
was received by Aldine from the Republican Committee for
Bonelli, the Spirits Foundation, the Research and Public
Relations Fund and retail liquor licensees in San Diego
and Long Beach.
George Kennedy testified that he first met Calhoun in
1950 in the personal office of William G. Bonelli. At that
time they discussed Bonelli's entire outdoor advertising campaign for the primary election. A short time later Calhoun,
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ordered certain
and directed him to
the work to the National Democratic Club of California .
.c'"couw~~.r did so and his bill was paid by the check of that club.
for the 1954 general election campaign was
for in a similar manner. Bonelli discussed with
the various plans of coverage. Calhoun ordered the work
and directed that it be billed to the Research and Public
Fund. Calhoun also decided to use some of the
for advertising Bonelli's book, the ''Billion Dollar
.uL<:.v••.,~v ... ' ' Kennedy put up the posters which he received.
The only payment received by Kennedy for this work was
a check for $1,500, drawn on the account of the Research
Public Relations Fund.
West, a publisher, told the grand jury that he
published Bonelli's book, the "Billion Dollar Blackjack."
The nominal printer and publisher was the Civic Research
an individual proprietorship owned by Bonelli. Under
arrangement, West billed Bonelli for a certain amount,
representing his cost of printing and profit. Bonelli paid a
portion of the bill by his personal checks or cash. In addiupon inquiry by West as to his bill, Bonelli called him
to his office. Calhoun was present and either he or Bonelli
gave West a check for $3,000 signed by Calhoun and drawn
on the account of the Research and Public Relations Fund.
\Vilbur Bassett testified that he was secretary-treasurer of
the Los .Angeles .Allied Printing Trades Council, a trade union
\Yhich published the ''Southland Almanac.'' In 1954, the
council was engaged in a labor controversy with the Los
lmgeles Times. Bassett asked Bonelli for a contribution and
was promised $2,500. Payment was made by means of seven
checks drawn by third persons to ''.Allied Printing,'' ''.Allied
Printing Council'' and ''.Allied Printing Co.,'' which were
obtained by Bassett's messenger at Bonelli's office.
In support of his petition for a writ of prohibition, Calhoun
urges that the evidence before the grand jury furnishes
no reasonable basis for the charges against him. He also
contends that the writ should issue because the trial judge
expressed bias and prejudice against him in ruling upon
his motion to set aside or quash the indictment. Finally,
he attacks both section 5002.5 of the Elections Code 1 and
HGHHAV""J

1

' ' § 5002.5.
Solicitation or receipt of money, etc. from licensee or
lieense holder. Any elective State officer who is authorized by law to
issue licenses, or who is a member of any board or ageney authorized
to issue licenses, or ~ny person seeking election to such office, board or
agency, or any appomtee or employee of such office, board or agency,
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section 182, subdivision 5, of the Penal Code 2 as being unconstitutional.
Calhoun argues that section 5002.5 of the Elections Code
creates an unreasonably narrow classification of persons from
whom campaign contributions may not be solicited or received.
There is no reasonable basis, he asserts, for setting licensees
apart from other persons who might contribute to a political
campaign.
In Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 [1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.
232], the court held constitutional a statute prohibiting certain federal officers and employees from giving political
contributions to, or receiving them from, each other. "If
contributions from those in public employment may be solicited by others in official authority," said the court, "it is
easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand,
and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated by
those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed duty growing out of the political relations of the
parties." (P. 374; cf. United States v. Wurzbach, . 280 U.S.
396 [50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508] [holding constitutional a
similar statute under which the defendant was indicted for
receiving and being concerned in receiving specified sums in
violation of it]; United Pttblic Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 [67 S.Ct. 556, 91 !J.Ed. 754] [holding the Hatch Act
constitutional].)
[1] Similarly, the Legislature might reasonably conclude
that the same danger exists in the case of an elective officer
empowered to issue licenses. What might begin as an innocent request or acceptance of a contribution from a licensee
might ripen into a demand with which the licensee must
comply in order to enjoy the privileges of his license.
Calhoun contends, however, that there is no reasonable basis
for limiting the prohibitions of such a statute to elective state
officers authorized by law to issue licenses. Similar dangers
exist, he urges, in the case of any other elective officer having
the power to favor one making a political contribution.
Furthermore, he argues, the statute has been applied diswho directly or indirectly solicits, receives or agrees to receive any money
or other thing of value, or any promise thereof, from any licensee named
in, or any holder of, any license issued by such officer, board or agency,
or from any agent of such licensee or license holder, for any political
campaign of any person seeking election or reelection to the office, board
or agency authorized to issue such license, is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
2
Subdivision 5 makes punishable a conspiracy "[to] commit any act
injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct
justice, or the due administration of the laws.''
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in that there has been no previous prosecution
it.
Undoubtedly the statute is narrowly drawn and this
may account for the absence of previous prosecutions
it. The Legislature, however, is free to recognize
""'''""''""of evil'' and deal with the ones which it deems most
(West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
[57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330]; Tigner v.
310 U.S. 141, 147 [60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124, 130
A.L.R. 1321]; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra, 330
75.) There is a reasonable basis for the conclusion
the danger of corrupt practice is greater in the case
the official having direct influence upon the right of the
licensee to conduct his business than in other situations.
[2] An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution
thereon prohibited if there is a rational ground for the conclusion that an offense has been committed and the accused
guilty of it. (Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d
183-184 [281 P.2d 250] .) [3] Discussing the requirements for a showing of probable cause in a prosecution for
conspiracy, the court stated in the Bompensiero case, quoting
from Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 57-58 [216
P.2d 859], " 'Direct proof of a formal understanding between parties to the conspiracy is not required as the basis
of an indictment or information. "[Ilt was not necessary
for the State to prove that the parties actually came together,
mutually discussed their common design, and after reaching
a formal agreement set out upon their previously agreed
course of conduct. The extent of the assent of minds which
are involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy
of the crime usually must be, inferred by the jury from the
of the facts and circumstances which, when taken
apparently indicate that they are parts to the
same complete whole." ' " (P. 184.)
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support
count I of the indictment, Calhoun urges that it establishes
his participation as a donor, or the agent of a donor,
in the making of contributions to Bonelli's campaigns. He
relies upon the rule, to which this court referred in denying
a petition for hearing in People v. Keyes, 103 Cal.App. 624,
646 [284 P. 1096], which precludes prosecution for conspiracy
to commit a substantive offense when the only concert of
action shown is that necessary to consummate the substantive
offense. ( Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 [53 S.Ct.
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77 L.Ed. 206, 84 A.L.R. 370] ; notes, 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 64,
70; 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 262.) There is little dispute, however,
that the evidence shows an elaborate conspiracy to utilize
contributions from both retail and wholesale liquor licensees
to finance Bonelli's political campaigns. Inferences which
reasonably may be drawn from that evidence fully support
the conclusion that Calhoun was connected with the general
program of the Bonelli campaigns in other ways than solely
as a donor to them.
The testimony of several witnesses places Calhoun in
Bonelli's office directly dealing or negotiating with persons
supplying printing or doing campaign work for Bonelli.
Kennedy visited Bonelli's office and, at a few times, saw
Calhoun there. On Kennedy's first call, Calhoun and Bonelli
discussed with him all of the outdoor advertising coverage
to be used in the campaign. Calhoun negotiated for billboard
space and placed all of the orders with Kennedy for Bonelli's
advertising. In1950, he directed Kennedy to bill the National
Democratic Club of California for the work. This is a direct
link between Calhoun and the proceeds from solicitation of
retail liquor licensees, for the evidence demonstrates that
the club was a recipient of such contributions, and there is
nothing to show that the Spirits Foundation was in any
way connected with the club. From that evidence, a reasonable grand juror would be justified in drawing the inference
that Calhoun knew that the club would be receiving funds
to be made available to Bonelli, and the source of such funds.
Other testimony placing Calhoun in Bonelli's office included
that of West and Woolever, each of whom received a check
from Calhoun for services rendered for Bonelli.
Other evidence connecting Calhoun with retail licensee
contributions includes the testimony of Weigel and Feinstein
regarding the transaction by which Calhoun obtained a fictitious receipt to cover his cash withdrawal of $1,500. That
he could obtain a receipt for checks received from retail liquor
licensees is reasonable ground for an inference that he had
knowledge of the manner in which Bonelli's printing from
Aldine was being financed. Also, Woolever said that he told
only Bonelli of the balance owing on his 1954 primary election
bill, but he was paid in full by a check directly traceable
to Calhoun which exactly closed out the account. This evidence indicates a much more intimate participation in Bonelli's campaigns than that of one who acted solely as a donor.
The indictment also might be based upon the use of the
funds of the Spirits Foundation and those deposited in the
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and Public Relations Fund. The
might conclude that all of the major liquor disin the
tributors
the Los Angeles area would not
Calhoun,
of their funds for an unlawful purpose and
them for the purpose of Bonelli's
acted
agent rather than for the association.
thousands of dollars, in addition to those received
the Spirits li'oundation, were deposited in the Research
and Public Relations Fund by wholesale liquor licensees of
This is direct evidence
1dwm Calhoun was not an agent.
Calhoun "received" money for Bonelli's campaign and
his intimate participation in Bonelli's campaign it is
a reasonable inference that he acted in concert with Bonelli
so.
in
'rhere is no merit in the contention that subdivision 5
of section 182 of the Penal Code is unconstitutionaL The constitutionality of this statute was expressly upheld in Lorenson
,-. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 59-61 [216 P.2d 859], and
v. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d 510, 519 [248 P.2d 520].
eontrary to Calhoun's contention, full consideration
m1s given to the decision in JJJusser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 [68
S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562). (See People v. F·htllivan, at pp.
522-523.)
[6] The evidence is amply sufficient to support the
alleged in counts II and III. There is ground for
an inference that Bonelli and Calhoun acted in concert to
use Bonelli's position for their private gain in the ,Judson
and Garibaldi transactions. In the former, a Spirits Poundation eheck payable to Judson and, it may reasonably be
dra-wn by Calhoun or at his direction, was cashed
and the proceeds delivered to Bonelli's messenger. Similarly,
in the Garibaldi transaction Calhoun received cash from a
cheek ostensibly made to aid the opposition to Proposition 3,
which has not been accounted for. Other cash withdrawals
made by Calhoun from the research fund depend upon his
statements as to their use or receipts supplied by him. Some
of the receipts came from a book in Bonelli's office and one,
from the Aldine Company, was shown to have been given
for
purpose different from that represented. In several
instances, checks from the Spirits Foundation or the Research
and Public Relations Fund traceable to Calhoun were cashed
by Bonelli, or used to pay expenses incurred in connection
with his book. Also, on many occasions Bonelli cashed retail
~~v'~"'''~·" checks, and, although Calhoun is not directly linked
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to these transactions, it reasonably might be concluded that
they were a logical outgrowth of the conspiracy.
[7] Supporting the charge that Calhoun and Bonelli
conspired to prepare false papers and records is the evidence
as to the Aldine receipt, setting up by vVoolever of fictitious
ledger accounts to evidence funds received from Bonelli and
Calhoun, the checks given to the nonexistent Allied Printing
Company, the substitution of a new check for that made
out by the Mexican Villege to Bonelli's campaign fund,
Calhoun's use of the Research and Public Relations Fund as
a channel for remittances from the Spirits Foundation, the
transactions in the name of the National Democratic Club of
California, and other activities which, a reasonable grand
juror might infer, were done with the intent to disguise their
nature.
[8] The contention that the trial judge was biased against
Calhoun in ruling upon his motion to set aside the indictment
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the evidence to justify
the indictment insofar as it concerns the present petition.
If, at the time of trial, Calhoun believes that he will not
be able to obtain a fair and impartial hearing, he may present
his objections in the manner specified in section 170 et seq.
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Because of the misleading statements and inferences contained in the majority opinion, I find it necessary to restate
the facts here involved and to demonstrate that the majority
has in every instance gone out of its way to "draw" not only
the inferences most compatible with guilt but has manufactured inferences which it uses as a foundation for layer after
layer of more manufactured inferences until the entire shaky
structure collapses of its own weight. The unfortunate result
of the collapse is that a man, innocent of the crime with which
he was charged, must stand to answer in a criminal court.
To anyone who has read and studied the entire lengthy record
in this case as I have done, the reason for the so-called inference drawing is obvious-Calhoun rnust be held to answer
and even though all that is necessary is a ''strong suspicion''
of guilt that suspicion had to be created out of whole cloth.
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Many unfounded statements are made in the majority
opinion. The following admission in the majority opinion
shows conclusively the falsity of the conclusion that Mr.
Calhoun was guilty as charged : ''Principally, the evidence
presented to the grand jury pertains to contributions made
bv wholesale licensees and by retail licensees in San Diego
• Los Angeles Counties. Similar operations were carried
on in Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. This
eYidence, with the inferences reasonably to be drawn from it,
shows the following pattern of activity in San Diego County.
. . . '' The charge against Calhoun was that of solicitation,
not contribution. All of the facts stated in the majority
opinion have to do with solicitation of liquor licensees by
Bonelli and others. This case deals only with Calhoun.
Before the conclusion of the grand jury may be upheld by
this court, something must be found which ties Calhoun in
with the program of solicitation carried on by Bonelli. I will
show, conclusively, that while the majority opinion rambles
on and on incoherently with facts proving Bonelli guilty of
solicitation, there is nothing whatsoever in the record showing
that Calhoun conspired with him in that program of solicitation.
Petitioner was accused by the grand jury of three counts
of conspiracy. Count One accused him of the crime of conspiracy to violate section 5002.5 of the Elections Code in
that he, together with William G. Bonelli, and certain others,
did "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together to commit the crimes of soliciting,
asking and receiving cash political contributions and contributions of things of monetary value from persons who were
named in licenses to sell alcoholic beverages issued by the
Board of Equalization of the State of California, said Board
being duly authorized to issue said licenses; and to solicit,
ask and receive cash contributions and contributions of things
of monetary value from holders of licenses to sell alcoholic
beverages issued by the Board of Equalization of the State
of California, said Board being duly authorized to issue said
licenses, for the use in campaigns for re-election of William G.
Bonelli as a member from the Fourth District of the Board of
Equalization of the State of California at times when William G. Bonelli was then and there a duly elected and duly
member of the Board of Equalization of the State
California.'' In the second count, petitioner was charged
conspiring with William G. Bonelli, and others, in that
46 C.2d-2
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they did "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, conspire,
confederate and agree to do acts injurious to the public morals
and to pervert and obstruct justice and the due administration
of the laws; whereas the said WrLJ_,IAM G. BoNELLI from
January, 1938, until December, 1954, was . . . the duly
elected member of the Board of Equalization, Fourth District,
of the State of California; that while acting as such member
of the Board of Equalization the said WILLIAM G. BoNELLI
at the official meetings of the duly elected Board of Equalization and in his official capacity presented matters for the
consideration of and made recommendations to the Board
of Equalization in matters pertaining to the official duties of
the Board of Equalization; the said WILLIAM G. BoNELLI,
BERNARD F. [sic] CALHOUN . . . did wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together
to use the said William G. Bonelli's official position of membership of the Board of Equalization . . . for the private
gain of said co-conspirators in that said defendants and their
co-conspirators did agree among themselves that they would
unlawfully collect funds from licensees and applicants for
licenses of the Board of Equalization for the private gain
of William G. Bonelli . . . and for the private gain of all
said defendants and co-conspirators." Count Three charges
petitioner, William G. Bonelli, and others, "of the crime of
Conspiracy to do Acts Injurious to Public Morals and to
Pervert and Obstruct Justice and the Due Administration
of the Laws (Penal Code 182, subd. 5) committed as follows:
The said William G. Bonelli and Bernard P. Calhoun [and
others] did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, conspire, confederate and agree together to prepare misleading,
false and deceitful papers, records and instruments in writing,
with the intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudulent and deceitful purposes upon trials, proceedings and
inquiries authorized by law, for the purpose of perverting
and obstruction (sic] justice and the due administration
of the law."
It appears that this matter as it relates to petitioner must
turn on a construction of section 5002.5 of the Elections Code
which provides:
''Any elective State officer who is authorized by law to
issue licenses or who is a member of any board or agency
authorized to issue licenses, or any person seeking election
to such office, board or agency . . . who directly or indirectly
solicits, receives or agrees to receive any money or other
thing of value, or any promise thereof, from any licensee
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in, or any holder of, any license issued by such officer,
or agency . . . for any political campaign of any
person seeking election or reelection to the office, board or
agency authorized to issue such license, is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
Section 182, subdivision 5, of the Penal Code, contains
conspiracy statute, and makes criminal a conspiracy ''To
any act injurious to the public health, to public
or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws."
Petitioner is not a state officer of any kind; he is an attorney
at law. For many years petitioner has been retained by
Southern California Spirits Foundation as executive
secretary, general counsel, labor relations advisor, and public
relations man. The Southern California Spirits Foundation,
hereinafter called Spirits Foundation, is a trade association
·whose membership consists of all but one of the persons, or
corporations,* engaged in the wholesale liquor business in
southern California.
Spirits Foundation, together with
Southern California Business Men's Association, another
group of those interested in the liquor business, and hereinafter called Business Men's Association, have, for many
years participated in various political campaigns where issues
of interest to the industry were involved. These two groups
throughout the years, contributed sums of money to
defeat measures thought to be inimical to the welfare of the
industry, and to promote measures thought to be for
its best interests. 'l'hey have, also, contributed sums of money
for the campaigns of various political candidates for local,
county, state, and federal offices.
The members of Spirits Foundation were, as has been prestated, those engaged in the wholesale liquor business
in southern California. 'rhese persons voluntarily associated
tog'ether for their mutual benefit. Dues were paid on a monthly
basis and were computed on a gallonage sold basis. The
' computation was made as the gallonage was reflected
the members' tax statements to the State of California
and a 1 per cent or, later, a 1% per cent assessment made
thereon. Statements of dues owed were mailed each month
each member of the Foundation. The avowed purposes
*'l'he one wlwlesaler not a member is a distillery. 'l'his distille1-y
desired membership but was not acceptable to the :B'oundation as a
member because it either sold direct to the retailers or desired to do so.
This procedure would eliminate the wholesaler.
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of the Spirits Foundation were as heretofore set forth: to
contribute funds to oppose inimical legislation; to promote
favorable legislation; to aid financially in the campaigns of
various candidates for divers public offices; to handle tax
matters and litigation for the various members, both individually and collectively, when it affected the group as a
whole. A reading of the record shows that petitioner attended all Board of Equalization meetings; that he was
frequently in Sacramento; that he had copied lists of all
rules, regulations, laws, relating to the industry, and changes
therein, and sent these copies to the members of Spirits
Foundation. The record shows that Mr. Calhoun was given
carte blanche permission to make the necessary decisions regarding the disbursement of Spirits Foundation funds in
line with the objectives to be achieved. It is also shown that
members of Spirits Foundation met together several times
each month.
The Southern California Business Men's Association is
an organization of business men who are in the hotel, restaurant, grocery, drug, distilled spirits, beer, wine and manufacturing businesses. It appears to be a trade association of
representatives from all the diverse branches of the liquor
industry, or businesses having any connection therewith. It
was organized originally for the purpose of assisting in the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and has, ever since,
acted as a coordinating agency of the people represented in
the alcoholic beverage industry. Its source of funds is membership dues and assessments, or contributions made by the
regular membership. The association issues slates of recommended candidates and publicizes the recommendations to its
membership and others. Spirits Foundation is a regular
member of the Business Men's Association in its function as
representative of the wholesale liquor dealers. Petitioner is
a director of Business Men's Association. Business Men's
Association was also interested in legislation affecting the
interests of its membership and had special funds set up
with which to oppose, or advocate such legislation, depending
on its effect on the industry. Albert V. Weigel acted as executive vice president and secretary of the association.
Research and Public Relations Fund was a fund that had
been established for a number of years prior to the ones under
consideration and had been set up to take care of matters
affecting the liquor industry as they were reflected in legislation and to support candidates for various public offices.
Prior to 1954, however, the Fund had been inactive, although

CALHOUN

v.

SUPERIOR COURT

[46 C.2d 18; 291 P.2d 474]

small balance had been carried over from year to year.
In 1954, the Fund was reactivated primarily for the purpose
of defeating Proposition 3 at the general election of that
year. Although five persons were authorized to sign checks
thereon, each check requiring two signatures, only petitioner
Mr. \Veigel signed the checks drawn on this account.
1954 practically all of the monies in the Fund were
transferred to it from Spirits Foundation.
The record shows that the members of Southern California
Business Men's Association agreed at a meeting between
themselves upon a budget they considered necessary for the
defeat of Proposition 3. Some of the members were not
willing that any of these monies be used for that purpose
until all contributions were in and the budget completed. Mr.
Calhoun testified that it was for this reason, as well as for
other reasons of convenience, that funds from Spirits Foundation vvere transferred to the Fund. Mr. Calhoun testified as
an additional reason for the transfer of fundB and use of
the Research Fund that he did not sign checks drawn on
Spirits Foundation although he directed the expenditure of
its funds. The checks were signed by two officers of the
Foundation and many times one or the other of these officers
was unavailable; sometimes one or the other of these officers
would sign checks in blank, so that if he happened to be out
of town, the check would require only the one additional
~ignature.

'The record shows from a question or statement made by
J\Ir. Sheela, Deputy District Attorney, to a witness that the
grand jury proceedings were had on the theory that it was
unlawful for a licensee to contribute, however voluntarily,
to the campaign of any member of the board issuing the
license. Mr. Sheela made this statement to a witness:
''. . . I will tell you simply, you understand our problem,
it is against the law for any liquor licensee to contribute to
the campaign of Mr. Bonelli. . . . " The pattern was setthat the prohibition of this statute extended to the donor as
well as the donee.* Since there was ample evidence that Mr.
Calhoun's organization contributed to Bonelli's campaign,
it is obvious that the grand jury could have been, and undoubtedly was, under the impression that Mr. Calhoun was
•·while section 5002.6 of the Elections Code prohibits a licensee from
making a contribution to the political campaign of a person seeking
election to the ''office, board or agency authorized to issue such license.''
this section is not involved here.
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accused of such contributions in violation of section 5002.6
of the Elections Code. 'l'his was not the case-~he was charged
with conspiracy to solicit-not to give.
The entire record deals with Bonelli and his program of
solicitation from retail liquor licensees and inasmuch as the
jury was informed that it was against the law for any liquor
licensee to contribute, it is obvious that Mr. Calhoun was
caught in the gigantic net spread to catch those soliciting
when he, in truth and in fact, only donated-a crime with
which he was not charged. The theory of the prosecution
could only have had the effect of causing untold confusion
in the minds of the jurors and to make it now impossible
to ascertain whether the grand jury considered him guilty
of conspiracy to solicit or to give. Petitioner here claimed
his constitutional provilege against self-incrimination when
questions were asked him concerning Mr. Bonelli, or his campaign. He also refused to answer questions concerning
S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, the
Honorable Goodwin J. Knight, Governor of California, and
Attorney General Edmund G. Brown.
There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record that
the association of wholesale liquor dealers in Spirits Foundation was other than voluntary; there is absolutely no evidence
which would show, or even tend to show, that Spirits Foundation was organized at the instance of Mr. Bonelli, or Mr.
Calhoun, either singly or together, for any purpose. There
is nothing in the record to show that the funds received by
Spirits Foundation were given other than voluntarily, or
that they were anything more than previously agreed upon
membership dues of that association which had certain, definite
objectives to be achieved for the common good of the members.
There is also no evidence in the record that petitioner used
the funds except as the membership intended they be used.
Justice Edmonds states, however, that "The indictment also
might be based upon the use of the funds of the Spirits
Foundation and those deposited in the Research and Public
Relations Fund. The grand jurors reasonably might conclude
that all of the major liquor distributors in the Los Angeles
area would not acquiesce in the use of their funds for an
unlawful purpose and that Calhoun, in using them for the
purpose of Bonelli's campaigns, acted as his agent rather
than for the association." If the grand jury so inferred,
then it was guilty of the wildest possible speculation.
During the 1954 campaign a considerable amount of money
was contributed toward the campaigns of a number of indi-
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rmnmmg :for various public offices by paying portions
their campaign bills. There is evidence which shows
that certain printing bills incurred by Mr. Bonelli, or those
in his behalf, were paid by checks drawn on Spirits
and the Research Fund; there is also evidence
a bill :for billboard advertising for Mr. Bonelli's campaign
and his book were paid by a check drawn on the Research
Fund or on Spirits Foundation; there is evidence that Spirits
defrayed part of the cost of printing Mr. Bonelli's
book. There is evidence that petitioner was seen in Mr.
's office but there is no evidence that he was there other
than on business for Spirits Foundation. Justice Edmonds
makes much of the fact that Calhoun was seen in Bonelli's
office and that he paid some of Bonelli's campaign expenses
from that office with Spirits Foundation funds. In my opinthe only inference to be drawn therefrom is that wholesale
money was being donated to pay those expenses-a
again, with which Calhoun was not charged. There is
no evidence that Mr. Bonelli received any direct cash contributions from these two funds, or that Mr. Calhoun received
money for personal use other than his salary from the
Foundation.
1'he statute ( Elec. Code, § 5002.5) prohibits any elective
::;tate officer authorized by law to issue licenses from directly,
or indirectly, soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive money
or any other thing of value, or any promise thereof, from
any licensee, for any political campaign. The statute was
designed to prevent the exercise of coercion by those having
the power to issue, or withhold, licenses upon those desiring
them. Its construction should be no greater than necessary
to subserve the purpose sought to be achieved ( Gebardi v.
Fnite'd States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206,
84 A.L.R. 370]). A statute should be construed with reference
to its purpose and the evils to be cured thereby (14 Cal.Jur.2d
~
p. 312; People v. Jackson, 24 Cal.App.2d 182, 198 [7 4
P.2d 1085] ). Moreover, since the statute under consideration
is also a criminal one, the one accused of its violation is
t•ntitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether
it arises out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of language used therein. (Ex Parte Rosenheim, 83 CaL
891 r23 P. 372] ; 14 CaLJnr.2d § 104, p. 310; Downing v.
Jlunie1:pal Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 345, 349 (198 P.2d 923) ;
People v. Ralph, 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401]; People v.
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Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Showalter, 126 Cal.App. 665, 669 [14 P.2d 1034]; In re McVickers,
29 Cal.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40]; In re Bramble, 31 Cal.2d
43, 51 [187 P.2d 411].)
It should be noted here that this statute prohibits only the
soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive money, or its
equivalent. It does not prohibit an individual licensee, or
group of such licensees, from voluntarily contributing to such
official campaign. This court, in construing such a statute,
should not engraft thereon a provision which the Legislature
in its wisdom did not see fit to include when enacting the
measure ( Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 [53 S.Ct.
35, 77 L.Ed. 206, 84 A.L.R. 370]) or extend it by implication
(In re Stra~d, 125 Cal. 415, 417 [58 P. 62]; Daman v. Hunt,
47 Cal.App. 274, 280 [191 P. 376]; Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal.
121, 133 [99 Am.Dec. 256]; Weimer v. Lowery, 11 Cal. 104,
112; Burdge v. Underwood, 6 Cal. 45; Chapman v. Aggeler,
47 Cal.App.2d 848, 853 [119 P.2d 204]; Hossom v. City of
Long Beach, 83 Cal.App.2d 745, 757 [189 P.2d 787]). Penal
statutes must be construed to reach no further than their
words; no person can be made subject to them by implication
(DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139,
156 [187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382]) and a penal statute may
not, under any rule of construction, be so read as to reach
further than its words (In re Twing, 188 Cal. 261, 265 [204
P. 1082]; Ex parte Kohlet·, 74 Cal. 38, 44 [15 P. 436]; People
v. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104, 107; Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 3,
19, 21)
Petitioner was charged with "soliciting, asking and receiving cash political contributions'' from holders of liquor
licenses. I find nothing in the record to substantiate this
charge other than his own statement that as executive secretary
of a trade association he billed members of his association
for their dues. Before petitioner can be tried under this
statute the evidence must show that he conspired with Mr.
Bonelli, a state elective official, and others, to solicit funds
from holders of liquor licenses.
In viewing this statute I find, then, that it does not prohibit
the giving, but only the receiving, of campaign funds from
licensees. It has been held in numerous cases that conspiracy
requires, as an essential element, a concert of action of two
or more persons.
The rule that conspiracy will not lie where the commission
of the substantive offense requires a concert of action has
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iu the following cases: United States v. Katz
, 271 U.S. 334 [46 S.Ct. 513, 70 L.Ed.
] ; Yannata v. United Slates (reeogniziug rule but holding
under facts), 289 P. 424; Robilio v. United
(liquor transportation; recognizing rule but holding it
I·"'""'""U"v under facts), 291 P. 975 ( cert. den. 263 U.S. 716
S.Ct. 137, 68 L.Ed. 522]); Lisansky v. United States
\
false partnership ineome tax return; rule reeognized,
but held inapplieable), 31li'.2d 846, 67 A.L.R. 67 (cert. den.
, U.S. 87B [49 S.Ct. 514, 73 L.Ed. 1008]); Norris v. United
(transportation of liquor), 34 F.2d 839; United States
(bribery), 49 J?.2d 725; Ex parte O'Leary (bribery),
.2d 956; Cnrtis v. United States (rule recognized, but
inapplieable under faets), 67 P.2d 943; People v. Wetten(bribery), 98 Colo. 193 [58 P.2d 579, 104 A.L.R. 1423] ;
Commonwealth v. Carroll (statutory rape), 8 Pa.D.&C. 271;
Commonwealth v. Bricket· (abortion), 74 Pa.Super. 234; Comv. Maxberry (receiving stolen goods), 13 Pa.D.&C.
i United States v. Dietrich (bribery), 126 P. 664; United
States v. New York Cent. & II. R. R. Co. (illegal rebate),
1-Hi P. 298.
In the present case, as in the Gebardi case, if conspiracy
is held to lie, the very immunity granted by this statute
implication, withdrawn.
In addition to the necessity for a concert of action, and
allird thereto, in conspiraey eases it is necessary that
tlH.'re be a joint intent and common purpose among those
accused of eonspiracy to commit a crime or achieve an unlawful end (People v. lJicJiianis, 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 900 [266
P
134] ; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 484 [229 P. 40] ;
v. Griffin, 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 43, 44 [219 P.2d 519] ;
Y. lJiontgomery, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 11 [117 P.2d 437] ;
Y. Eiseman, 78 Cal.App. 223, 244 [248 P. 716]; People
104 Cal.App.2d 402, 414 [231 P.2d 896]; People v.
36 Cal.2d 234, 236 [223 P.2d 17]). Taking this
element into consideration, it is doubtful that petitioner could,
umlf'r the facts here presented, have conspired with Mr.
Bonelli to reeeive campaign contributions. In an article in 26
Southern California Law Review, 64, 70, (Criminal LawConspiracy and Conspirators in California) it is said: ''Conreach an agreement with a common intent and purpoSfJ in mind. This concert of purpose is a necessary element
Gf the crime. There are a number of crimes which two
parties ean agree to eommit, but which they cannot conspire
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enter the agreement with different
adultery, bigamy and subordation of
are crimes of this class. [Note, 104 A.L.R. 1430
1936).] Two parties may conspire to give a bribe [People v.
98
1, 219 P.2d 519 (1950)) ; they may
to accept a bribe [People v. Savage, 15 Cal.App.2d
59 P.2d 190 (1936).]; they may commit bribery, one
and one accepting [People v. Sheffield, 108 Cal.App.
721, 293 P. 72 ( 1930).] ; but they cannot conspire to commit
bribery, one to give and one to accept. [People v. Keyes, 284
P. 1105 (Cal. 1930), in denying rehearing [sic] on 103 CaL
App. 624, 284 P. 1096.]"
In Peop~e v. Keyes, 103 Cal.App. 624, 646 [284 P. 1096],
this court, in denying a hearing, had this to say: ''In denying
the petition for hearing in this court after decision by the
District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division
Two, in the above-entitled cause, we deem it proper to say
that we withhold our approval of so much of the opinion
rendered as holds that in California, contrary to rulings
elsewhere, an unlawful agreement between two parties, the
one to give and the other to receive a bribe, may constitute
a criminal conspiracy. It is true that a set of defendants
may conspire to give or a set of defendants may conspire to
receive or accept a bribe, but bribery requires for its consummation the unlawful concert of one or more persons acting
with one or more other persons having a different motive
or purpose. That being true, there is in such a case no room
for the operation of a charge of conspiracy. In the indictment before us Rosenberg and his codefendants, other than
Keyes, are properly charged with a conspiracy to offer and
g·ive a bribe to ,;airl clrfendant, hnt as to rlefendant Keyes,
him~(·lf, a (•riminal conspiracy ran not he properly charged."
It appears obvious that the rule which holds that there
cannot be a conspiracy between the donor and donee of a
bribe stems from the essential requirement that there be a
common unlawful motive. The giver expects a different type
of consideration than the donee receives and hence a different
motive or intent is involved. Assuming for the moment that
the purposes and objectives of Spirits Foundation were specifically prohibited by a statute, it is apparent that in paying
Mr. Bonelli's campaign printing bills, Spirits Foundation
had a motive entirely different from that of Mr. Bonelli in
accepting the benefit. Under this rule petitioner could not
have conspired with Mr. Bonelli because there is no evidence
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whatsoever to show that he and Mr. Bonelli
to solicit
receive funds from liquor licensees. Here the undisputed
evidence shows that petitioner was at all times employed by,
acted as agent for, Spirits Foundation which was the
of any campaign contributions received
Mr. Bonelli
this source. There is no evidence from which an infer~
could be drawn that petitioner at any time acted for,
or on behalf of, Mr. Bonelli in the solicitation of
contributions from liquor licensees. 'While it may be inferred
petitioner and Mr. Bonelli agreed that certain campaign
contributions would be made, petitioner was always in the
of the donor and Mr. Bonelli the donee of such
contributions and there could not have existed the common
nnlawfulmotive between them which is necessary to constitute
eriminal conspiracy under the authorities above cited.
In People v. Bnffum, 40 Cal.2d 709, 722 et seq. [256 P.2d
, we held that a woman submitting to an abortion cannot
guilty of a conspiracy with the one committing the abortion.
We said: ''Section 182 of the Penal Code, which proscribes
conspiracy to commit a crime, is closely analogous to section
Both provisions operate generally with respect to crimes
''"~Hv~ in other statutes, and both designate persons who may
be punished because of their connection with activities per~
taining to such crimes. In our opinion the same reasoning
which precludes the application of section 31 for the purpose
of prosecuting a woman as a principal under section 274
likewise precludes the use of section 182 in prosecuting her
conspiracy to violate section 274. Since as held in the
Clapp case f24 Cal.2d 835 ( 151 P.2d 237) (accomplice)], the
Legislature has expressed an intent that a woman who consents and voluntarily submits to an abortion is not punishable
under section 274, it clearly did not intend that she should
punished for conspiracy to violate that statute. Although
the language of section 182, standing alone, is sufficiently
broad to include any agreement to proeure an abortion, the
provision, Jike that in section 31, is general and must yield
to the specific provision in section 275. Any other construction
would mean that the coui<pirac.v law conld be used as a device
defeating the legislative intention of
a lesser
pvLH<L'"J on a woman who violates section 275 than is prescribed
for a person convicted under section 274.
"'l'here are many cases arising under other statutes in
which it has been recognized that a defendant may be liable
prosecution for com;piracy to commit a given crime even
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of committing the crime itself. (See
States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
[60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129]; United
States
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 [35 S.Ct. 682, 59 L.Ed.
; People v. W oocl, 145 Cal. 659, 664-665 [79 P. 367] ;
also cases collected in annotations in 131 A.L.R. 1110,
1114-1115; 5 A.L.R. 782, 787-791.) This rule, however, does
not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense
disclose an affirmative legislative policy that the conduct of
one of the parties involved shall be punished. ( Gebarcli v.
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121-123 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed.
206, 84 A.L.R. 370]; In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443 [67 A.2d 141,
145]; see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 [66
S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed 1489]; State v. McLaughlin, 132 Conn.·
325 [ 44 A.2d 116, 120-121].) Similarly, the rule should not
be applied where, as here, the Legislature singles out one
of the parties for special treatment by enacting a statute
which deals only with the conduct of that person and provides for a lesser punishment than is given to the other party.''
(See also People v. Stone, 89 Cal.App.2d 853, 869 [202 P.2d
333], wherein it was held that there could be no conspiracy
in such a case.) In State v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158 [2
N.W.2d 833, 837, 139 A.L.R. 987], the same problem was
involved and it was held that the one performing the abortion
and the one submitting thereto could not be conspirators.
Reliance was placed on the rule that the giving and taking
of bribes were separate and distinct offenses.
Here, as in the Buffum case, the Legislature has singled
out one of the parties for ''special treatment'' by making
it a crime to solicit, receive, etc., campaign contributions
from licensees. The Legislature did not see fit in the statute
under consideration to make it a crime for any licensee to
contribute voluntarily. Here, the "statutes defining the substantive offense disclose an affirmative legislative policy that
the conduct of one of the parties involved shall be unpunished" (People v. Buffum, at page 722). In Gebardi v.
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119-120 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed.
206, 84 A.L.R. 370], the Supreme Court had this to say:
"We come thus to the main question in the case, whether,
admitting that the woman, by consenting, has not violated
the Mann Act, she may be convicted of a conspiracy with
the man to violate it. Section 37 of the Criminal Code (18
U.S.C., § 88), punishes a conspiracy by two or more persons
'to commit any offense against the United States.' The offense
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is charged with conspiring to commit is that
by the man, for it is not questioned that in
her he contravened section 2 of the Mann Act.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 [37 S.Ct. 192,
61 L.Ed. 442]. Hence >ve must decide whether her conlvhich was not criminal before the Mann Act, nor
by it, may, without more, support a conviction
the conspiracy section, enacted many years before.
"As was said in the Holte case (p. 144 [United States v.
236 U.S. 140 (35 S.Ct. 271, 59 L.Ed. 504, L.R.A.
1915D 281)]), an agreement to commit an offense may be
though its purpose is to do what some of the conmay be free to do alone. Incapacity of one to
the substantive offense does not necessarily imply
that he may with impunity conspire with others who are
able to commit it. For it is the collective planning of criminal
conduct at which the statute aims. The plan itself is a
wrong which, if any act be done to effect its object, the state
has elected to treat as criminal, Clune v. United States, 159
U.S. 590, 595 [16 S.Ct. 125, 40 L.Ed. 269, 271]. And one
may plan that others shall do what he cannot do by himself.
See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86, 87 [35
682, 59 L.Ed. 1211, 1214, 42 Am.Bankr.Rep. 255].
"But in this case we are concerned with something more
than an agreement between two persons for one of them
to commit an offense which the other cannot commit. There
is the added element that the offense planned, the criminal
of the conspiracy, involves the agreement of the woman
to her transportation by the man, which is the very concharged . . . .
"\Ve do not rest our decision upon the theory of those
[therefore cited and here omitted] cases, nor upon the
related one that the attempt is to prosecute as conspiracy
acts identical with the substantive offense. United States v.
Dietn:ch, 126 F. 664. We place it rather 1lpon the ground
that we perceive in the failttre of the JJiann Act to condemn
the woman's participation in those transportations which
are effected by her mere consent, evidence of an affirmative
legislative policy to leave her acquiescence nnpttnishecl. We
think it a necessary implication of that policy that when
the Mann Act and the conspiracy statute came to be construed tog·ether, as they necessarily would be, the same participation which the former contemplates as an inseparable
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all caRes in which the woman is a voluntary agent
not
was automatically to be made
U-'-'""'...,"""""J under the latter. It would contravene that policy
the Mann Act effected a
to hold that the very passage
withdrawal
the
statute
that immun1:ty which
the Mann Act
" (Emphasis added; see also
Freeman v. Un·ited Stales (conspiracy to commit offense of
unlawfully selling
, 146 F.2d 978; People v. Purcell
(conspiracy to play poker), 304 Ill.App. 215 [26 N.E.2d 153] ;
Dodson v. United States (conspiracy to violate Mann Act)
(Ky.), 215 F.2d 196; United States v. Hagan (conspiracy to
harbor fug·itive), 27 F.Supp. 814.)
The third count of the indictment is, apparently, based
upon the fact that petitioner did not keep detailed books
and records of his expenditures and that many of the checks
drawn on both funds were drawn either to him personally
or to cash. In some instances there were no receipts for
the monies expended. Petitioner explained that many of
them were drawn for travelling expenses, salary checks to
various employees, bills that he had incurred, liquor bills
where the liquor had been donated by Spirits Foundation
to charitable organizations, to candidates who did not wish
their constituents to know that a liquor organization was
backing them.* Many of these expenditures were listed under
the heading ''Campaign Contributions.'' There is again no
evidence which shows, or tends to show, that Mr. Bonelli
had anything to do with the manner in which petitioner's
books and records were kept. There is, further, no evidence
which either shows, or tends to show, that petitioner's books
were kept with the purpose claimed by the People-that
they were "misleading, false and deceitful" and so prepared
"with the intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudulent and deceitful purposes upon trials, proceedings and
inquiries authorized by law, for the purpose of perverting
and obstructing justice and the due administration of the
law." The majority, however, rely on the "Aldine receipt,"
the ''setting up by Woolever of fictitious ledger accounts
to evidence funds received from Bonelli and Calhoun, the
checks given to the non-existent Allied Printing Company,
the substitution of a new check for that made out by the
Mexican Village to Bonelli's campaign fund, Calhoun's use
of the Research and Public Relations Fund as a channel for
hut

*It is inferable that some of these cash checks were used to pay
printing bills for Mr. Bonelli's eampaign.
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from the Spirits Foundation,
transactions
the name of the National Democratic Club of California,
other activities which, a reasonable grand juror might
were done with the intent to disguise their nature.''
have heretofore discussed the '' Aldine receipt.'' So far
the Woolever fictitious ledger accounts are
the
opinion shows merely that "\Voolever himself set
account up and at Bonelli's request charged it with three
one of which was a Spirits Foundation check. There
nothing to show that Calhoun knew that vVoolever did
no printing for Proposition 3 or that a Spirits Foundation
was charged to such an account. The only inference
to be drawn from such evidence is that Bonelli was guilty
double-crossing his benefactors. There is no evidence in
record that Calhoun knew that the Allied Printing Comwas not in existence and again, the only inference to
be drawn is that Bonelli was guilty of a subterfuge. So far
the substitution of a new check for that made out by the
JHexican Village to Bonelli's campaign fund, that was part
the mass of evidence relating to Bonelli's program of
solicitation from retail liquor licensees and the author of
majority opinion has not succeeded in any way whatsoever
in connecting Calhoun with that program or with Bonelli's
participation in that program. The case of the Mexican Viicheck is another instance where the author of the rnaopinion has grasped at a tiny particle of immaterial
evidence in the massive record and tossed it into his horrenmess. Calhoun's use of Spirits Foundation funds has
been heretofore discussed in detail and even to the most
casual reader it must be apparent that the evidence as it
relates thereto does not lead to an inference that Calhoun
guilty of solicitation or of keeping false books with the
purpose charged. The transactions relating to the National
Democratic Club have nothing at all to do with Calhoun.
the vaguest recollection of Mr. Kennedy in 1955 that
he thmtght Calhoun told him in 1950 to bill that club is the
basis for the statements made in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion singles out several isolated bits of
evidenee and from these bits builds unwarranted inference
upon illogical inference. We are told that on one occasion
the Aldine Printing Company billed the Business Men's
Association for $3,000 as a charge for printing some booklets;
when Weigel told Calhoun of this bill, Calhoun told
him to write a check on the public relations fund for $1,500;
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that later Calhoun received from \Veigel cash for the "balance
of $1507" ($1,500 plus $1,500 equals $3,000; $1,507 plus
$1,500 equals $3,007) and that later Calhoun presented a
receipt from the Aldine Printing Company for that amount.
vV e are then informed that the record shows that the receipt
was fictitious and did not represent a cash payment but
was given to acknowledge receipt of several small checks
made payable to Aldine. Then comes the inference ! That it
is ''reasonable'' to assume that these checks were from retail
liquor licensees either in San Diego or Long Beach. vVhat
the record really shows is this: That Feinstein testified
that Calhoun had never asked him for a fictitious invoice;
that Weigel did not say he got the receipt from Calhoun but
that "We got a receipt from the Alcline Company for the
$1,507.35, whatever it was--"; that there is not one scrap
of evidence to show that Calhoun had anything whatsoever
to do with the receipt or, what is more important, that he
knew of its so-called fictitious character; that there is absolutely nothing in the record to show what small checks comprised the payment.
The next bit of evidence is the Judson transaction. The
author of the majority opinion doesn't even try to tie Calhoun in with that. The only point in the evidence is that
Bonelli had a Spirits Foundation check in his possession
which he asked Judson to cash for him. There is nothing
to show that Calhoun even knew of the transaction or that
Judson ever heard of Calhoun. In fact the evidence is to
the contrary. In the same paragraph, however, we are informed that a check made payable to James Garibaldi was
"handled the same way." What the record really shows is
this: That when the check was delivered to Mr. Garibaldi's
office, he was out of town; that the purpose of the check was
to pay Mr. Garibaldi for work to be done on Proposition 3;
that Mr. Garibaldi was informed of this when he telephoned
his secretary later in the day and at that time told her he
would not be able to accept the employment; that she deposited the check and drew another one payable to Calhoun's
secretary at his request. From this the majority infer that
Bonelli and Calhoun acted in concert to use Bonelli's position
for their private gain in the "Judson and Garibaldi transactions.''
Other evidence relied upon by the majority opinion is that
Calhoun 1vas seen in Bonelli's office; that he there paid, with
Spirits Foundation funds, certain campaign expenses in-
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by Bonelli. This, again, shows only that Calhoun
was guilty of violating the statute respecting donations but
does not have a thing to do with the crime with which he
charged. While the majority opinion covers numerous
pages, a close reading thereof will show that these "bits" of
from which the staggering number of inferences
drawn are reiterated over and over again-and that the
balance of the evidence set forth relates only to Bonelli and
program of solicitation from retail liquor licensees. Because a witness testified in 1955 that he "thought" Calhoun
him, in the year 1950, to bill the National DemoClub for certain outdoor advertising for Bonelli, it
inferred that "Calhoun knew that the club would be
receiving funds to be made available to Bonelli and the source
of such funds'' and that this is a ''direct link between Calhoun and the proceeds from solicitation of retail liquor
licensees. ''
\V e are also informed that several thousands of dollars,
in addition to those received from the Spirits Foundation,
were deposited in the Research and Public Relations Fund
>vholesale liquor licensees of whom Calhoun was not an
and that this was ''direct evidence that Calhoun 'received' money for Bonelli's campaign and from his intimate
participation in Bonelli's campaign it is a reasonable inference
that he acted in concert with Bonelli in doing so." As I
have said before the only inference which can logically and
reasonably be drawn is that Calhoun was using wholesale
funds to support Bonelli's campaign. There is not one
scintilla of any kind of evidence, direct or otherwise, that
he had anything to do with the solicitation of those funds;
or that he conspired with Bonelli in soliciting such funds.
is no evidence whatsoever that Calhoun was not in
Bonelli's office on Spirits Foundation business. In fact, the
entire record shows that he was there on Spirits Foundation
business.
The majority is forced to admit that there is nothing in
the record to link Calhoun with the cashing of retail liquor
licensee checks by Bonelli but then illogically concludes that
may reasonably be inferred that these transactions were
"logical outgrowth of the conspiracy."
In answer to my argument that there can be no conspiracy
between the donor and the donee, the author of the majority
opinion says that there "is little dispute, however, that the
evidence shows an elaborate conspiracy to utilize contribu-
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from both retail and wholesale liquor licensees to finance
political campaigns. Inferences which reasonably
may be drawn from that evidence fully support the conclusion that Calhoun was connected with the general program
of the Bonelli campaigns in other ways than solely as a
donor to them.'' The author apparently ran out of inferences
because he fails to draw any at this point. There is ample
evidence to show that Calhoun was a donor of Spirits Foundation funds, but the only evidence linking him with Bonelli
as a solicitor is that he was seen in Bonelli's office. Mere
association does not make a conspiracy (Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.2d 153 [183 P.2d 724]) ; even
though direct proof of a formal understanding between parties
to a conspiracy is not required (Lorenson v. Superior' Court,
35 Cal.2d 49 [216 P.2d 859]).
We said in People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d
344], that "It must be remembered that the evidence before
a committing magistrate at a preliminary examination need
not be such as would require a conviction. Section 872 of
the Penal Code provides that the defendant must be held
to answer if 'it appears from the examination that a public
offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to
believe the defendant guilty thereof.' Section 1487, subdivision 7, of the Penal Code provides that a party is entitled to
discharge upon habeas corpus proceedings where he has 'been
committed on a criminal charge without reasonable or probable cause'; 'sufficient cause,' therefore, means no more than
that. (People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885 [129 P.2d 367] ;
Cleughv. Strakosch (C.C.A. 9), 109 F.2d 330; In re Martinez,
36 Cal.App.2d 687 [98 P.2d 528] .) 'Reasonable and probable cause' may exist although there may be some room for
doubt." (In re McCarty, 140 Cal.App. 473, 474 [35 P.2d
568] ; In re Mesquita, 139 Cal.App. 91 [33 P.2d 459); Ex
parte Heacock, 8 Cal.App. 420 [97 P. 77]; Ex parte Vice,
5 Cal.App. 153 [89 P. 983] .) Applying the above rules
to this case, it is at once obvious that the evidence at the
very most leads only to speculation that Calhoun was guilty
as charged. The strongest evidence produced from which
even the vaguest inference of his guilt could be drawn is
that he was seen in Bonelli's office. The author of the majority opinion confuses the issue by reciting all the evidence
relating to Bonelli's solicitation and then scrambling that
evidence with evidence of Calhoun's donation of Spirits
Foundation funds. Taking the scrambled mess as a whole
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clear to me that

not lead a "man of
and commientiously
of the accused.''
is much more than some room for doubt here-there
spceulation that Calhoun is guilty as
"Spccu'
does not measure up to any definition of
cause with which I am familiar.
majority opinion here depicts with unusual force the
in the following quotation from Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion in Krnlewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
445 et seq. [69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790]: "The unprotest of courts against the growing habit to indict
conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for the substantive
itself, or in addition thereto, suggests that loose practice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness
in our administration of justice.
''The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost
definition. Despite certain elementary and essential
"'"un,u"g' it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration
from each of the many independent offenses on which it may
overlaid. . . .
''An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right
to trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.' The leverage of a
conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution
and reduces its protection to a phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been committed in any district
where any one of the conspirators did any one of the acts,
however innocent, intended to accomplish its object.
''The trial of a conspiracy charge doubtless imposes a heavy
burden on the prosecution, but it is an especially difficult
situation for the defendant. The hazard from loose application of rules of evidence is aggravated where the Government
institutes mass trials. . . .
"A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy
There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by
It is difficult for the individual to make his own
stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who
ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked toIf he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often
happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other. There are
many practical difficulties in defending against a charge of
conspiracy which I will not enumerate. . . .
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''There is, of course, strong temptation to relax rigid
standards when it seems the only way to sustain convictions
of evil-doers. But statutes authorize prosecution for substantive crimes for most evil-doing without the dangers to
the liberty of the individual and the integrity of the judicial
process that are inherent in conspiracy charges. We should
disapprove the doctrine of implied or constructive crime in
its entirety and in every manifestation. .And I think there
should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction
where prosecution for the substantive offense is adequate and
the purposes served by adding the conspiracy charge seems
chiefly to get procedural advantages to ease the way to conviction.''
I have heretofore shown that the statute (Elec. Code,
§ 5002.5) proscribes only the solicitation or receipt of campaign contributions from licensees and not the giving thereof.
I have also carefully examined the record and have failed
to :find any evidence to substantiate the charge that petitioner
conspired with Mr. Bonelli in either soliciting or receiving
funds for Mr. Bonelli's campaign. I :find only that petitioner,
as executive secretary of a trade association, Spirits Foundation, received dues from its members, a percentage of which
funds were used voluntarily to pay printing and advertising
bills for Mr. Bonelli in his campaign for reelection to the
State Board of Equalization. Inasmuch as the Legislature
did not see :fit to make the voluntary donation of such funds
a crime under this statute, it follows that there is no evidence
connecting petitioner with the crimes charged in the indictment and the writ should therefore issue.
I would, therefore, let the writ of prohibition issue as
prayed for.
SCHAUER, J., dissenting.
Because the record in this case discloses what appear to
have been widespread and unlawful practices of a highly
unsavory character, participated in by persons with whom
this petitioner had dealings or was employed, and, as to
certain activities, by himself, it is difficult to confine our
thinking to the narrow legal question upon which we must
rule .
.As to the law generally as stated in the majority opinion
I am in full accord with the principles there expressed but
in careful detailing of the evidence, and as to the law which
by our prior decisions should be applicable upon the facts
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are shown either directly or by tenable inference, I
impelled to the conclusion that Mr. Justice Carter's disis well taken.
The majority opinion correctly summarizes the charges
in counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment. Each and
those counts confine their charges of criminality by
to acts committed in confederation with board
Bonelli either in soliciting and collecting contributions for him and his objectives, or a like confederation "to
prepare misleading, false and deceitful papers ... with the
intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudulent .. .
purposes ... for the purpose of perverting ... justice ... "
is my view that the entire record, fairly considered,
leads unmistakably to the conclusion that at least as to the
first two counts the grand jury proceedings were conducted
on the theory that it was unlawful for a licensee to contribute,
yoluntarily or otherwise, to a campaign fund of any member
of the Board of Equalization. Section 5002.6 of the Elections
Code expressly covers such a situation and the evidence
appears amply sufficient to establish that the petitioner's
employers 1vere licensees, and that they did make and that
petitioner participated in making, such prohibited contributions. However, for some reason which is not readily apparent,
the indictment which was returned does not charge violation
of, or conspiracy to violate, section 5002.6. Instead, as hereinabove indicated, it specifically charges the petitioner with
(Count I) conspiring with board member Bonelli to violate
section 5002.5 of the Elections Code in that they did "feloniously combine . . . and agree together to commit the crimes
of soliciting, asking and receiving cash political contributions and . . . things of monetary value from persons who
·were named in licenses to sell alcoholic beverages issued by
tlle Board of Equalization"; (Count II) with conspiring
with the board member and others "to do acts injurious to
the public morals and to pervert and obstruct justice and
the due administration of the laws; . . . to use the . . . official position of membership of the Board of Equalization
. . . for the private gain of said co-conspirators in that said
defendants and their co-conspirators did agree among themselves that they would unlawfully collect funds from licensees
and applicants for licenses of the Board of Equalization
... "; and (Count III) with confederation in the preparation
of false papers or records, as hereinabove indicated.
I a.grre with the holding of the majority that the statute

!J4

CALHOUN

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

[46 C.2d

in question
Code, § 5002.5) is a valid exercise of the
police power and that, as held in Bompensiero v. Superior
Court (1955), 44 Cal.2d 178, 183-184 (281 P.2d 250], an
indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon
prohibited if there is a rational
for the conclusion
that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty
of it. But the offense for which there is a rational ground
of believing the defendant
must be the offense which
is charged in the indictment.
we held that
''A. person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a
necessarily included offense) not charged against him by
indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence
at his trial to show that he had committed that offense."
(In re Hess (1955), 45 Cal.2d 171, 174-175 [288 P.2d 5].)
Upon the record before us I see no rational ground upon
which any of the charges laid against petitioner could be
sustained. Conceivably, he might be convicted (since the
grand jury indicted) if the evidence in the record were
presented to a jury, but upon appeal (or even on habeas
corpus) on such a record I think we should be bound to reverse. The conviction would no more be tenable than the
conviction in the Hess case, supra. True, the rule is different
on this proceeding from what it would be on appeal, and I
have already indicated my recognition of that difference by
my reference to Bornpensiero v. Superior Cour't (1955), supra,
44 Cal.2d 178, 183-184, but the record here does not withstand the Bompensiero test. I cite the Hess case to illustrate
the futility of putting the state and the defendant to the
expense of a trial on an indictment charging specific offenses
but upon evidence which proves other offenses.
For the reasons stated I would issue the writ of prohibition.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied ,Jannary 25, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion
i hat the application should be granted.

